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Abstract
The popularity of JavaScript has lead to a large ecosystem
of third-party packages available via the npm software pack-
age registry. The open nature of npm has boosted its growth,
providing over 800,000 free and reusable software packages.
Unfortunately, this open nature also causes security risks, as
evidenced by recent incidents of single packages that broke
or attacked software running on millions of computers. This
paper studies security risks for users of npm by systematically
analyzing dependencies between packages, the maintainers
responsible for these packages, and publicly reported secu-
rity issues. Studying the potential for running vulnerable or
malicious code due to third-party dependencies, we find that
individual packages could impact large parts of the entire
ecosystem. Moreover, a very small number of maintainer ac-
counts could be used to inject malicious code into the majority
of all packages, a problem that has been increasing over time.
Studying the potential for accidentally using vulnerable code,
we find that lack of maintenance causes many packages to de-
pend on vulnerable code, even years after a vulnerability has
become public. Our results provide evidence that npm suffers
from single points of failure and that unmaintained pack-
ages threaten large code bases. We discuss several mitigation
techniques, such as trusted maintainers and total first-party
security, and analyze their potential effectiveness.
1 Introduction
JavaScript has become one of the most widely used program-
ming languages. To support JavaScript developers with third-
party code, the node package manager, or short npm, provides
hundreds of thousands of free and reusable code packages.
The npm platform consists of an online database for search-
ing packages suitable for given tasks and a package manager,
which resolves and automatically installs dependencies. Since
its inception in 2010, npm has steadily grown into a collection
of over 800,000 packages, as of February 2019, and will likely
grow beyond this number. As the primary source of third-party
JavaScript packages for the client-side, server-side, and other
platforms, npm is the centerpiece of a large and important
software ecosystem.
The npm ecosystem is open by design, allowing arbitrary
users to freely share and reuse code. Reusing a package is as
simple as invoking a single command, which will download
and install the package and all its transitive dependencies.
Sharing a package with the community is similarly easy, mak-
ing code available to all others without any restrictions or
checks. The openness of npm has enabled its growth, provid-
ing packages for any situation imaginable, ranging from small
utility packages to complex web server frameworks and user
interface libraries.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, npm’s openness comes with secu-
rity risks, as evidenced by several recent incidents that broke
or attacked software running on millions of computers. In
March 2016, the removal of a small utility package called
left-pad caused a large percentage of all packages to become
unavailable because they directly or indirectly depended on
left-pad.1 In July 2018, compromising the credentials of the
maintainer of the popular eslint-scope package enabled an
attacker to release a malicious version of the package, which
tried to send local files to a remote server.2
Are these incidents unfortunate individual cases or first
evidence of a more general problem? Given the popularity
of npm, better understanding its weak points is an important
step toward securing this software ecosystem. In this paper,
we systematically study security risks in the npm ecosystem
by analyzing package dependencies, maintainers of packages,
and publicly reported security issues. In particular, we study
the potential of individual packages and maintainers to impact
the security of large parts of the ecosystem, as well as the
ability of the ecosystem to handle security issues. Our analysis
is based on a set of metrics defined on the package dependency
graph and its evolution over time. Overall, our study involves
5,386,239 versions of packages, 199,327 maintainers, and
1https://www.infoworld.com/article/3047177/javascript/
how-one-yanked-javascript-package-wreaked-havoc.html
2https://github.com/eslint/eslint-scope/issues/39
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609 publicly known security issues.
The overall finding is that the densely connected nature of
the npm ecosystem introduces several weak spots. Specifi-
cally, our results include:
• Installing an average npm package introduces an implicit
trust on 79 third-party packages and 39 maintainers, cre-
ating a surprisingly large attack surface.
• Highly popular packages directly or indirectly influence
many other packages (often more than 100,000) and are
thus potential targets for injecting malware.
• Some maintainers have an impact on hundreds of thou-
sands of packages. As a result, a very small number
of compromised maintainer accounts suffices to inject
malware into the majority of all packages.
• The influence of individual packages and maintainers
has been continuously growing over the past few years,
aggravating the risk of malware injection attacks.
• A significant percentage (up to 40%) of all packages
depend on code with at least one publicly known vulner-
ability.
Overall, these findings are a call-to-arms for mitigating se-
curity risks on the npm ecosystem. As a first step, we discuss
several mitigation strategies and analyze their potential effec-
tiveness. One strategy would be a vetting process that yields
trusted maintainers. We show that about 140 of such maintain-
ers (out of a total of more than 150,000) could halve the risk
imposed by compromised maintainers. Another strategy we
discuss is to vet the code of new releases of certain packages.
We show that this strategy reduces the security risk slightly
slower than trusting the involved maintainers, but it still scales
reasonably well, i.e., trusting the top 300 packages reduces
the risk by half. If a given package passes the vetting process
for maintainers and code, we say it has “perfect first-party
security”. If all its transitive dependencies pass the vetting
processes we say that it has “perfect third-party security”.
If both conditions are met, we consider it a “fully secured
package”. While achieving this property for all the packages
in the ecosystem is infeasible, packages that are very often
downloaded or that have several dependents should aim to
achieve it.
2 Security Risks in the npm Ecosystem
To set the stage for our study, we describe some security-
relevant particularities of the npm ecosystem and introduce
several threat models.
2.1 Particularities of npm
Locked Dependencies In npm, dependencies are declared
in a configuration file called package.json, which specifies
the name of the dependent package and a version constraint.
The version constraint either gives a specific version, i.e., the
dependency is locked, or specifies a range of compatible ver-
sions, e.g., newer than version X. Each time an npm package
is installed, all its dependencies are resolved to a specific
version, which is automatically downloaded and installed.
Therefore, the same package installed on two different ma-
chines or at two different times may download different ver-
sions of a dependency. To solve this problem, npm introduced
package-lock.json, which developers can use to lock their tran-
sitive dependencies to a specific version until a new lock file
is generated. That is, each package in the dependency tree is
locked to a specific version. In this way, users ensure uniform
installation of their packages and coarse grained update of
their dependencies. However, a major shortcoming of this ap-
proach is that if a vulnerability is fixed for a given dependency,
the patched version is not installed until the package-lock.json
file is regenerated. In other words, developers have a choice
between uniform distribution of their code and up-to-date
dependencies. Often they choose the later, which leads to a
technical lag [12] between the latest available version of a
package and the one used by dependents.
Heavy Reuse Recent work [11, 18] provides preliminary
evidence that code reuse in npm differs significantly from
other ecosystems. One of the main characteristic of the npm
ecosystem is the high number of transitive dependencies. For
example, when using the core of the popular Spring web
framework in Java, a developer transitively depends on ten
other packages. In contrast, the Express.js web framework
transitively depends on 47 other packages.
Micropackages Related to the reuse culture, another inter-
esting characteristic of npm is the heavy reliance on packages
that consist of only few lines of source code, which we call
micropackages. Related work documents this trend and warns
about its dangers [1, 19]. These packages are an important
part of the ecosystem, yet they increase the surface for certain
attacks as much as functionality heavy packages. This exces-
sive fragmentation of the npm codebase can thus lead to very
high number of dependencies.
No Privilege Separation In contrast to, e.g., the Java se-
curity model in which a SecurityManager3 can restrict the
access to sensitive APIs, JavaScript does not provide any kind
of privilege separation between code loaded from different
packages. That is, any third-party package has the full privi-
leges of the entire application. This situation is compounded
by the fact that many npm packages run outside of a browser,
in particular on the Node.js platform, which does not provide
any kind of sandbox. Instead, any third-party package can
access, e.g., the file system and the network.
3https://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/api/java/lang/
SecurityManager.html
No Systematic Vetting The process of discovering vulner-
abilities in npm packages is still in its infancy. There currently
is no systematic vetting process for code published on npm.
Instead, known vulnerabilities are mostly reported by indi-
viduals, who find them through manual analysis or in recent
research work, e.g., injection vulnerabilities [30], regular ex-
pression denial of service [9,29], path traversals [16], binding
layer bugs [6].
Publishing Model In order to publish a package, a devel-
oper needs to first create an account on the npm website. Once
this prerequisite is met, adding a new package to the repos-
itory is as simple as running the “npm publish” command
in a folder containing a package.json file. The user who first
published the package is automatically added to the main-
tainers set and hence she can release future versions of that
package. She can also decide to add additional npm users as
maintainers. What is interesting to notice about this model
is that it does not require a link to a public version control
system, e.g., GitHub, hosting the code of the package. Nor
does it require that persons who develop the code on such
external repositories also have publishing rights on npm. This
disconnect between the two platforms has led to confusion4
in the past and to stealthy attacks that target npm accounts
without changes to the versioning system.
2.2 Threat Models
The idiosyncratic security properties of npm, as described
above, enable several scenarios for attacking users of npm
packages. The following discusses threat models that either
correspond to attacks that have already occurred or that we
consider to be possible in the future.
Malicious Packages (TM-mal) Adversaries may publish
packages containing malicious code on npm and hence trick
other users into installing or depending on such packages. In
2018, the eslint-scope incident mentioned earlier has been
an example of this threat. The package deployed its payload
at installation time through an automatically executed post-
installation script. Other, perhaps more stealthy methods for
hiding the malicious behavior could be envisioned, such as
downloading and executing payloads only at runtime under
certain conditions.
Strongly related to malicious packages are packages that
violate the user’s privacy by sending usage data to third par-
ties, e.g., insight5 or analytics-node6. While these libraries
are legitimate under specific conditions, some users may not
want to be tracked in this way. Even though the creators of
these packages clearly document the tracking functionality,
transitive dependents may not be aware that one of their de-
pendencies deploys tracking code.
4http://www.cs.tufts.edu/comp/116/archive/spring2018/
etolhurst.pdf
5https://www.npmjs.com/package/insight
6https://www.npmjs.com/package/analytics-node
Exploiting Unmaintained Legacy Code (TM-leg) As
with any larger code base, npm contains vulnerable code,
some of which is documented in public vulnerability
databases such as npm security advisories7 or Snyk vulnerabil-
ity DB8. As long as a vulnerable package remains unfixed, an
attacker can exploit it in applications that transitively depend
on the vulnerable code. Because packages may become aban-
doned due to developers inactivity [8] and because npm does
not offer a forking mechanism, some packages may never be
fixed. Even worse, the common practice of locking dependen-
cies may prevent applications from using fixed versions even
when they are available.
Package Takeover (TM-pkg) An adversary may convince
the current maintainers of a package to add her as a maintainer.
For example, in the recent event-stream incident9, the attacker
employed social engineering to obtain publishing rights on
the target package. The attacker then removed the original
maintainer and hence became the sole owner of the package.
A variant of this attack is when an attacker injects code into
the source base of the target package. For example, such code
injection may happen through a pull request, via compromised
development tools, or even due to the fact that the attacker
has commit rights on the repository of the package, but not
npm publishing rights. Once vulnerable or malicious code is
injected, the legitimate maintainer would publish the package
on npm, unaware of its security problems. Another takeover-
like attack is typosquatting, where an adversary publishes
malicious code under a package name similar to the name of
a legitimate, popular package. Whenever a user accidentally
mistypes a package name during installation, or a developer
mistypes the name of a package to depend on, the malicious
code will be installed. Previous work shows that typosquatting
attacks are easy to deploy and effective in practice [31].
Account Takeover (TM-acc) The security of a package
depends on the security of its maintainer accounts. An attacker
may compromise the credentials of a maintainer to deploy
insecure code under the maintainer’s name. At least one recent
incident (eslint-scope) is based on account takeover. While
we are not aware of how the account was hijacked in this
case, there are various paths toward account takeover, e.g.,
weak passwords, social engineering, reuse of compromised
passwords, and data breaches on npm.
Collusion Attack (TM-coll) The above scenarios all as-
sume a single point of failure. In addition, the npm ecosystem
may get attacked via multiple instances of the above threats.
Such a collusion attack may happen when multiple main-
tainers decide to conspire and to cause intentional harm, or
when multiple packages or maintainers are taken over by an
attacker.
7https://www.npmjs.com/advisories
8https://snyk.io/vuln/?type=npm
9https://github.com/dominictarr/event-stream/issues/116
3 Methodology
To analyze how realistic the above threats are, we systemati-
cally study package dependencies, maintainers, and known
security vulnerabilities in npm. The following explains the
data and metrics we use for this study.
3.1 Data Used for the Study
Packages and Their Dependencies To understand the im-
pact of security problems across the ecosystem, we analyze
the dependencies between packages and their evolution.
Definition 3.1 Let t be a specific point in time, Pt be a set of
npm package names, and Et = {(pi, p j)|pi 6= p j ∈ Pt} a set
of directed edges between packages, where pi has a regular
dependency on p j. We call Gt = (Pt ,Et) the npm dependency
graph at a given time t.
We denote the universe of all packages ever published on
npm with P . By aggregating the meta information about pack-
ages, we can easily construct the dependency graph without
the need to download or install every package. Npm offers
an API endpoint for downloading this metadata for all the
releases of all packages ever published. In total we consider
676,539 nodes and 4,543,473 edges.
To analyze the evolution of packages we gather data about
all their releases. As a convention, for any time interval t,
such as years or months, we denote with t the snapshot at the
beginning of that time interval. For example, G2015 refers to
the dependency graph at the beginning of the year 2015. In
total we analyze 5,386,239 releases, therefore an average of
almost eight versions per package. Our observation period
ends in April 2018.
Maintainers Every package has one or more developers
responsible for publishing updates to the package.
Definition 3.2 For every p ∈ Pt , the set of maintainers M(p)
contains all users that have publishing rights for p.
Note that a specific user may appear as the maintainer of
multiple packages and that the union of all maintainers in the
ecosystem is denoted with M .
Vulnerabilities The npm community issues advisories or
public reports about vulnerabilities in specific npm packages.
These advisories specify if there is a patch available and which
releases of the package are affected by the vulnerability.
Definition 3.3 We say that a given package p ∈ P is vul-
nerable at a moment t if there exists a public advisory for
that package and if no patch was released for the described
vulnerability at an earlier moment t ′ < t.
We denote the set of vulnerable packages with V ⊂ P . In
total, we consider 609 advisories affecting 600 packages. We
extract the data from the publicly available npm advisories10.
10https://www.npmjs.com/advisories
3.2 Metrics
We introduce a set of metrics for studying the risk of attacks
on the npm ecosystem.
Packages and Their Dependencies The following mea-
sures the influence of a given package on other packages in
the ecosystem.
Definition 3.4 For every p ∈ Pt , the package reach PR(p)
represents the set of all the packages that have a transitive
dependency on p in Gt .
Note that the package itself is not included in this set. The
reach PR(p) contains names of packages in the ecosystem.
Therefore, the size of the set is bounded by the following
values 0≤ |PR(p)|< |Pt |.
Since |PR(p)| does not account for the ecosystem changes,
the metric may grow simply because the ecosystem grows.
To address this, we also consider the average package reach:
PRt =
∑∀p∈Pt |PR(p)|
|Pt | (1)
Using the bounds discussed before for PR(p), we can calcu-
late the ones for its average 0≤ PRt < |Pt |. The upper limit is
obtained for a fully connected graph in which all packages can
reach all the other packages and hence |PR(p)|= |Pt |−1,∀p.
If PRt grows monotonously, we say that the ecosystem is get-
ting more dense, and hence the average package influences
an increasingly large number of packages.
The inverse of package reach is a metric to quantify how
many packages are implicitly trusted when installing a partic-
ular package.
Definition 3.5 For every p ∈ Pt , the set of implicitly trusted
packages ITP(p) contains all the packages pi for which
p ∈ PR(pi).
Similarly to the previous case, we also consider the size of
the set |ITP(p)| and the average number of implicitly trusted
package ITPt , having the same bounds as their package reach
counterpart.
Even though the average metrics ITPt and PRt are equiv-
alent for a given graph, the distinction between their non-
averaged counterparts is very important from a security point
of view. To see why, consider the example in Figure 1. The
average PR = IT P is 5/6 = 0.83 both on the right and on the
left. However, on the left, a popular package p1 is dependent
upon by many others. Hence, the package reach of p1 is five,
and the number of implicitly trusted packages is one for each
of the other packages. On the right, though, the number of
implicitly trusted packages for p4 is three, as users of p4
implicitly trust packages p1, p2, and p3.
p1
p3p2 p4 p5
p6
(a) Wide distribution of trust:
max(PR)= 5,max(ITP)= 1
p1
p2 p3
p4
p5p6
(b) Narrow distribution of trust:
max(PR) = 3,max(ITP) = 3
Figure 1: Dependency graphs with different maximum pack-
age reaches (PR) and different maximum numbers of trusted
packages (ITP).
Maintainers The number of implicitly trusted packages or
the package reach are important metrics for reasoning about
TM-pkg, but not about TM-acc. That is because users may de-
cide to split their functionality across multiple micropackages
for which they are the sole maintainers. To put it differently,
a large attack surface for TM-pkg does not imply one for
TM-acc.
Therefore, we define maintainer reach MRt(m) and implic-
itly trusted maintainers ITMt(p) for showing the influence of
maintainers.
Definition 3.6 Let m be an npm maintainer. The maintainer
reach MR(m) is the combined reach of all the maintainer’s
packages, MR(m) = ∪m∈M(p)PR(p)
Definition 3.7 For every p ∈ Pt , the set of implicitly trusted
maintainers ITM(p) contains all the maintainers that have
publishing rights on at least one implicitly trusted package,
ITM(p) = ∪pi∈ITP(p)M(pi).
The above metrics have the same bounds as their packages
counterparts. Once again, the distinction between the package
and the maintainer-level metrics is for shedding light on the
security relevance of human actors in the ecosystem.
Furthermore, to approximate the maximum damage that
colluding maintainers can incur on the ecosystem (TM-coll),
we define an order in which the colluding maintainers are
selected:
Definition 3.8 We call an ordered set of main-
tainers L ⊂ M a desirable collusion strat-
egy iff ∀mi ∈ L there is no mk 6= mi for which
∪ j<iMR(m j)∪MR(mi)< ∪ j<iMR(m j)∪MR(mk).
Therefore, the desirable collusion strategy is a hill climbing
algorithm in which at each step we choose the maintainer that
provides the highest local increase in package reach at that
point. We note that the problem of finding the set of n main-
tainers that cover the most packages is an NP-hard problem
called maximum coverage problem. Hence, we believe that
the proposed solution is a good enough approximation that
shows how vulnerable the ecosystem is to a collusion attack,
but that does not necessary yield the optimal solution.
Figure 2: Evolution of number of packages and maintainers.
Vulnerabilities For reasoning about TM-leg, we need to
estimate how much of the ecosystem depends on vulnerable
code:
Definition 3.9 Given all vulnerable packages pi ∈ Vt at
time t, we define the reach of vulnerable code at time t as
VRt = ∪pi∈Vt PR(pi).
Of course the actual reach of vulnerable code can not
be fully calculated since it would rely on all vulnerabilities
present in npm modules, not only on the published ones. How-
ever, since in TM-leg we are interested in publicly known
vulnerabilities, we define our metric according to this sce-
nario. In these conditions, the speed at which vulnerabilities
are reported is an important factor to consider:
Definition 3.10 Given all vulnerable packages pi ∈ Vt at
time t, we define the vulnerability reporting rate VRRt at
time t as VRRt =
|Vt |
|Pt | .
4 Results
We start by reporting the results on the nature of package level
dependencies and their evolution over time (corresponding
to TM-mal and TM-pkg). We then discuss the influence that
maintainers have in the ecosystem (related to TM-acc and
TM-coll). Finally, we explore the dangers of depending on
unpatched security vulnerabilities (addressing TM-leg).
4.1 Dependencies in the Ecosystem
To set the stage for a thorough analysis of security risks en-
tailed by the structure of the npm ecosystem, we start with
a general analysis of npm and its evolution. Since its incep-
tion in 2010, the npm ecosystem has grown from a small
collection of packages maintained by a few people to the
world’s largest software ecosystem. Figure 2 shows the evo-
lution of the number of packages available on npm and the
Figure 3: Evolution of direct package dependencies and its
impact on transitive dependencies. Note the logarithmic scale
on the y-axis.
number of maintainers responsible for these packages. Both
numbers have been increasing super-linearly over the past
eight years. At the end of our measurement range, there is
a total of 676,539 packages, a number likely to exceed one
million in the near future. These packages are taken care of
by a total of 199,327 maintainers. The ratio of packages to
maintainers is stable across our observation period (ranging
between 2.81 and 3.51).
In many ways, this growth is good news for the JavaScript
community, as it increases the code available for reuse. How-
ever, the availability of many packages may also cause devel-
opers to depend on more and more third-party code, which
increases the attack surface for TM-pkg by giving individual
packages the ability to impact the security of many other pack-
ages. The following analyzes how the direct and transitive de-
pendencies of packages are evolving over time (Section 4.1.1)
and how many other packages individual packages reach via
dependencies (Section 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Direct and Transitive Dependencies
Figure 3 shows how many other packages an average npm
package depends on directly and transitively. The number
of direct dependencies has been increasing slightly from 1.3
in 2011 to 2.8 in 2018, which is perhaps unsurprising given
the availability of an increasing code base to reuse. The less
obvious observation is that a small, linear increase in direct
dependencies leads to a significant, super-linear increase in
transitive dependencies. As shown by the upper line in Fig-
ure 3, the number of transitive dependencies of an average
package has increased to a staggering 80 in 2018 (note the
logarithmic scale).
From a security perspective, it is important to note that each
directly or transitively depended on package becomes part of
the implicitly trusted code base. When installing a package,
each depended upon package runs its post-installation scripts
on the user’s machine – code executed with the user’s operat-
ing system-level permissions. When using the package, calls
into third-party modules may execute any of the code shipped
with the depended upon packages.
When installing an average npm package, a user implic-
itly trusts around 80 other packages due to transitive
dependencies.
One can observe in Figure 3 a chilling effect on the number
of dependencies around the year 2016 which will become
more apparent in the following graphs. Decan et al. [14]
hypothesize that this effect is due to the left-pad incident. In
order to confirm that this is not simply due to removal of more
than a hundred packages belonging to the left-pad’s owner, we
remove all the packages owned by this maintainer. We see no
significant difference for the trend in Figure 3 when removing
these packages, hence we conclude that indeed there is a
significant change in the structure of transitive dependencies
in the ecosystem around 2016.
4.1.2 Package Reach
The above analysis focuses on depended upon packages. We
now study the inverse phenomenon: packages impacted by in-
dividual packages, i.e., package reach as defined in Section 3.
Figure 4 shows how many other packages a single package
reaches via direct or indirect dependencies. The graph at the
top is for an average package, showing that it impacts about
230 other packages in 2018, a number that has been growing
since the creation of npm. The graph at the bottom shows the
package reach of the top-5 packages (top in terms of their
package reach, as of 2018). In 2018, these packages each
reach between 134,774 and 166,086 other packages, making
them an extremely attractive target for attackers.
To better understand how the reach of packages evolves
over time, Figure 5 shows the distribution of reached pack-
ages for multiple years. For example, the red line shows that
in 2018, about 24,500 packages have reached at least 10 other
packages, whereas only about 9,500 packages were so in-
fluential in 2015. Overall, the figure shows that more and
more packages are reaching a significant number of other
packages, increasing the attractiveness of attacks that rely on
dependencies.
Some highly popular packages reach more than 100,000
other packages, making them a prime target for attacks.
This problem has been aggravating over the past few
years.
The high reach of a package amplifies the effect of both
vulnerabilities (TM-leg) and of malicious code (TM-mal).
As an example for the latter, consider the event-stream inci-
dent discussed when introducing TM-acc in Section 2.2. By
Figure 4: Evolution of package reach for an average package
(top) and the top-5 packages (bottom).
Figure 5: Distribution of package reach by individual pack-
ages, and how it changes over time. Note the log scale on the
vertical axis.
computing event-stream’s reach and comparing it with other
packages, we see that this package is just one of many possible
targets. As of April 1, 2018 (the end of our measurement pe-
riod), event-stream has a reach of 5,466. That is, the targeted
package is relatively popular, but still far from being the top-
most attractive package to compromise. In fact, 1,165 other
packages have a greater or equal reach than event-stream.
Variants of the event-stream attack could easily be re-
peated with other packages.
In order to perform a similar analysis for the eslint-scope
security incident, we need to use a slightly modified version
of package reach. This attack targeted a development tool,
namely eslint, hence, to fully estimate the attack surface we
need to consider dev dependencies in our definition of reach.
We do not normally consider this type of dependencies in our
measurements because they are not automatically installed
with a package, unlike regular dependencies. They are instead
used only by the developers of the packages. Therefore the
modified version of package reach considers both transitive
regular dependencies and direct dev dependencies.
We observe that eslint-scope has a modified reach of more
than 100,000 packages at the last observation point in the data
set. However, there are 347 other packages that have a higher
reach, showing that even more serious attacks may occur in
the future.
The attack on eslint-scope has targeted a package with
an influence not larger than that of hundreds of other
packages. It is likely that similar, or perhaps even worse,
attacks will happen and succeed in the future.
4.2 Analysis of Maintainers
We remind the reader that there is a significant difference
between npm maintainers and repository contributors, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.1. Even though contributors also have a
lot of control over the code that will eventually end up in an
npm package, they can not release a new version on npm, only
the maintainers have this capability. Hence, the discussion
that follows, about the security risks associated with maintain-
ers, should be considered a lower bound for the overall attack
surface.
Attacks corresponding to TM-acc in which maintainers are
targeted are not purely hypothetical as the infamous eslint-
scope incident discussed earlier shows. In this attack, a mali-
cious actor hijacked the account of an influential maintainer
and then published a version of eslint-scope containing ma-
licious code. This incident is a warning for how vulnerable
the ecosystem is to targeted attacks and how maintainers in-
fluence can be used to deploy malware at scale. We further
discuss the relation between packages and maintainers.
Figure 6: Evolution of maintainers sorted by package count
per year.
4.2.1 Packages per Maintainer
Even though the ecosystem grows super-linearly as discussed
in Section 4.1, one would expect that this is caused mainly by
new developers joining the ecosystem. However, we observe
that the number of packages per maintainer also grows sug-
gesting that the current members of the platform are actively
publishing new packages. The average number of packages
controlled by a maintainer raises from 2.5 in 2012 to 3.5 in
2013 and almost 4.5 in 2018. Conversely, there are on aver-
age 1.35 maintainers in the lifetime of a package. The top
5,000 most popular packages have an average number of 2.83
maintainers. This is not unexpected, since multiple people are
involved in developing the most popular packages, while for
the majority of new packages there is only one developer.
Next, we study in more detail the evolution of the number
of packages a maintainer controls. Figure 6 shows the main-
tainer package count plotted versus the number of maintainers
having such a package count. Every line represents a year.
The scale is logarithmic to base 10. It shows that the majority
of maintainers maintain few packages, yet some maintain-
ers maintain over 100 packages. Over the years, the package
count for the maintainers increased consistently. In 2015, only
slightly more than 25,000 maintainers maintained more than
one package, whereas this number has more than tripled by
2018.
We further analyze five different maintainers in top 20
according to number of packages and plot the evolution of
their package count over the years in Figure 7. types is the
largest maintainer of type definitions for TypeScript, most
likely a username shared by multiple developers at Microsoft,
ehsalazar maintains many security placeholder packages, jon-
schlinkert and sindresorhus are maintaining many micropack-
ages and isaacs is the npm founder. From Figure 7 we can
see that for two of these maintainers the increase is super-
linear or even near exponential: types and kylemathews have
Figure 7: Evolution of package count for six popular main-
tainers.
sudden spikes where they added many packages in a short
time. We explain this by the tremendous increase in popular-
ity for TypeScript in the recent years and by the community
effort to prevent typosquatting attacks by reserving multiple
placeholder. The graph of the other maintainers is more linear,
but surprisingly it shows a continuous growth for all the six
maintainers.
The number of packages that both the influential and
the average maintainers control increased continuously
over the years.
4.2.2 Implicitly Trusted Maintainers
One may argue that the fact that maintainers publish new
packages is a sign of a healthy ecosystem and that it only
mimics its overall growth. However, we show that while that
may be true, we also see an increase in the general influence
of maintainers. That is, on average every package tends to
transitively rely on more and more maintainers over time.
In Figure 8 we show the evolution of IT Mt , the average
number of implicitly trusted maintainers. As can be seen,
IT Mt almost doubled in the last three years for the average
npm package, despite the plateau of the curve reached in 2016
which we again speculate it is caused by the left-pad incident.
This is a worrisome development since compromising any
of the maintainer accounts a package trusts may seriously
impact the security of that package, as discussed in TM-acc.
The positive aspect of the data in Figure 8 is that the growth
in the number of implicitly trusted maintainers seems to be
less steep for the top 10,000 packages compared to the whole
ecosystem. We hypothesize that the developers of popular
packages are aware of this problem and actively try to limit
the IT Mt . However, a value over 20 for the average popular
package is still high enough to be problematic.
Figure 8: Evolution of average number of implicitly trusted
maintainers over years in all packages and in the most popular
ones.
Figure 9: Number of implicitly trusted maintainers for top
10,000 most popular packages.
The average npm package transitively relies on code
published by 40 maintainers. Popular packages rely on
only 20.
When breaking the average IT Mt discussed earlier into in-
dividual points in Figure 9, one can observe that the majority
of these packages can be influenced by more than one main-
tainer. This is surprising since most of the popular packages
are micropackages such as "inherits" or "left-pad" or libraries
with no dependencies like "moment" or "lodash". However,
only around 30% of these top packages have a maintainer cost
higher than 10. Out of these, though, there are 643 packages
influenced by more than a hundred maintainers.
More than 600 highly popular npm packages rely on
code published by at least 100 maintainers.
Figure 10: Distribution of maintainers reach in different years.
4.2.3 Maintainers Reach
In Figure 10, we plot the reach MRt of the maintainers in the
npm ecosystem. The reach has increased over the years at all
levels. For example, in 2015 there were 2,152 maintainers
that could affect more than 10 packages, and this number
increased to 4,041 in 2016, 6,680 in 2017 and finally reaching
an astonishingly high 10,534 in 2018. At the other end of
the distribution, there were 59 maintainers that could affect
more than 10,000 packages in 2015, 163 in 2016, 249 in
2017 and finally 391 in 2018. The speed of growth for MRt
is worrisome, showing that more and more developers have
control over thousands of packages. If an attacker manages
to compromise the account of any of the 391 most influential
maintainers, the community will experience a serious security
incident, reaching twice as many packages as in the event-
stream attack.
391 highly influential maintainers affect more than
10,000 packages, making them prime targets for attacks.
The problem has been aggravating over the past years.
Finally, we look at the scenario in which multiple popular
maintainers collude, according to the desirable collusion strat-
egy introduced in Section 3.2, to perform a large-scale attack
on the ecosystem, i.e., TM-col. In Figure 11 we show that
20 maintainers can reach more than half of the ecosystem.
Past that point every new maintainer joining does not increase
significantly the attack’s performance.
4.3 Security Advisories Evolution
Next, we study how often vulnerabilities are reported and
fixed in the npm ecosystem (TM-leg). Figure 13 shows
the number of reported vulnerabilities in the lifetime of the
ecosystem. The curve seems to resemble the evolution of
number of packages presented in Figure 2, with a steep in-
crease in the last two years. To explore this relation further
we plot in Figure 14 the evolution of the number of advisories
Figure 11: Combined reach of 100 influential maintainers.
Figure 12: Total reach of packages for which there is at least
one unpatched advisory (vulnerability reach VRt ).
Figure 13: Evolution of the total and unpatched number of
advisories.
Figure 14: Evolution of VRRt , the rate of published vulnera-
bilities per 10,000 packages.
reported per 10,000 packages and we observe that it grows
from two in 2013 to almost eight in 2018. This is a sign of a
healthy security community that reports vulnerabilities at a
very good pace, keeping up with the growth of the ecosystem.
When analyzing the type of reported vulnerabilities in de-
tails, we observe that almost half of the advisories come from
two large-scale campaigns and not a broader community ef-
fort: First, there are 141 advisories published in January 2017
involving npm packages that download resources over HTTP,
instead of HTTPs. Second, there are 120 directory traver-
sal vulnerabilities reported as part of the research efforts of
Liang Gong [16]. Nevertheless, this shows the feasibility of
large-scale vulnerability detection and reporting on npm.
Publishing an advisory helps raise awareness of a security
problem in an npm package, but in order to keep the users
secure, there needs to be a patch available for a given advi-
sory. In Figure 13 we show the evolution of the number of
unpatched security vulnerabilities in npm, as defined in Sec-
tion 3. This trend is alarming, suggesting that two out of three
advisories are still unpatched, leaving the users at risk. When
manually inspecting some of the unpatched advisories we
notice that a large percentage of unpatched vulnerabilities are
actually advisories against malicious typosquatting packages
for which no fix can be available.
To better understand the real impact of the unpatched vul-
nerabilities we analyze how much of the ecosystem they im-
pact, i.e., vulnerability reach as introduced in Section 3.2. To
that end, we compute the reach of unpatched packages at
every point in time in Figure 12. At a first sight, this data
shows a much less grim picture than expected, suggesting
that the reach of vulnerable packages is dropping over time.
However, we notice that the effect of vulnerabilities tends
to be retroactive. That is, a vulnerability published in 2015
affects multiple versions of a package released prior to that
date, hence influencing the data points corresponding to the
years 2011-2014 in Figure 12. Therefore, the vulnerabilities
Figure 15: Correlation between number of vulnerabilities and
number of dependencies.
that will be reported in the next couple of years may correct
for the downwards trend we see on the graph. Independent
of the downwards trend, the fact that for the majority of the
time the reach of vulnerable unpatched code is between 30%
and 40% is alarming.
Up to 40% of all packages rely on code known to be
vulnerable.
5 Potential Mitigations
The following section discusses ideas for mitigating some of
the security threats in the npm ecosystem. We here do not
provide fully developed solutions, but instead outline ideas
for future research, along with an initial assessment of their
potential and challenges involved in implementing them.
5.1 Raising Developer Awareness
One line of defense against the attacks described in this paper
is to make developers who use third-party packages more
aware of the risks entailed by depending on a particular pack-
age. Currently, npm shows for each package the number of
downloads, dependencies, dependents, and open issues in the
associated repository. However, the site does not show any
information about the transitive dependencies or about the
number of maintainers that may influence a package, i.e., our
ITP and ITM metrics. As initial evidence that including such
metrics indeed predicts the risk of security issues, Figure 15
shows the number of implicitly trusted packages versus the
number of vulnerabilities a package is affected by. We find
that the two values are correlated (Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.495), which is not totally unexpected since adding
more dependencies increases the chance of depending on vul-
nerable code. Showing such information, e.g., the ITP metric,
could help developers make more informed decisions about
which third-party packages to rely on.
Figure 16: Decrease in average number of implicitly trusted
maintainers and packages as the set of trusted maintainers or
packages increases.
5.2 Warning about Vulnerable Packages
To warn developers about unpatched vulnerabilities in their de-
pendencies, the npm audit tool has been introduced. It com-
pares all directly depended upon packages against a database
of known vulnerabilities, and warns a developer when depend-
ing upon a vulnerable version of a package. While being a
valuable step forward, the tool currently suffers from at least
three limitations. First, it only considers direct dependencies
but ignores any vulnerabilities in transitive dependencies. Sec-
ond, the tool is limited to known vulnerabilities, and hence its
effectiveness depends on how fast advisories are published.
Finally, this defense is insufficient against malware attacks.
5.3 Code Vetting
A proactive way of defending against both vulnerable and
malicious code is code vetting. Similar to other ecosystems,
such as mobile app stores, whenever a new release of a vetted
package is published, npm could analyze its code. If and only
if the analysis validates the new release, it is made available to
users. Since the vetting process may involve semi-automatic
or even manual steps, we believe that it is realistic to assume
that it will be deployed step by step in the ecosystem, starting
with the most popular packages. Figure 16 (orange curve)
illustrates the effect that such code vetting could have on
the ecosystem. The figure shows how the average number of
implicitly trusted packages, ITP, reduces with an increasing
number of vetted and therefore trusted packages. For exam-
ple, vetting the most dependent upon 1,500 packages would
reduce the ITP ten fold, and vetting 4,000 packages would
reduce it by a factor of 25.
An obvious question is how to implement such large-scale
code vetting, in particular, given that new versions of pack-
ages are released regularly. To estimate the cost of vetting new
releases, Figure 17 shows the average number of lines of code
Figure 17: Number of lines of code that need to be vetted for
achieving a certain number of trusted packages.
that are changed per release of a package, and would need to
be vetted to maintain a specific number of trusted packages.
For example, vetting the changes made in a single new release
of the top 400 most popular packages requires to analyze over
100,000 changed lines of code. One way to scale code vet-
ting to this amount of code could be automated code analysis
tools. Recently, there have been several efforts for improving
the state of the art of security auditing for npm, both from
academia, e.g., Synode [30], BreakApp [32], NodeSec [16],
NoRegrets [25], Node.cure [10], and from industry practi-
tioners, e.g., Semmle11, r2c12, and DeepScan13. Orthogonal
to automated code analysis tools, the npm community could
establish crowd-sourced package vetting, e.g., in a hierarchi-
cally organized code distribution model similar to the Debian
ecosystem.
Another challenge for code vetting is that npm packages, in
contrast to apps in mobile app stores, are used across different
platforms with different security models. For example, XSS
vulnerabilities are relevant only when a package is used on the
client-side, whereas command injection via the exec API [30]
is a concern only on the server-side. A code vetting process
could address this challenge by assigned platform-specific
labels, e.g., “vetted for client-side” and ”vetted for server-
side”, depending on which potential problems the vetting
reveals.
5.4 Training and Vetting Maintainers
Another line of proactive defense could be to systematically
train and vet highly influential maintainers. For example, this
process could validate the identity of maintainers, support
maintainers in understanding basic security principles, and
ensure that their accounts are protected by state-of-the-art
techniques, such as two-factor authentication. To assess the
11https://semmle.com/
12https://r2c.dev/
13https://deepscan.io/
effect that such a process would have, we simulate how train-
ing and vetting a particular number of trusted maintainers in-
fluences the average number of implicitly trusted maintainers,
ITM. The simulation assumes that the most influential main-
tainers are vetted first, and that once a maintainer is vetted
she is ignored in the computation of the ITM. The results of
this simulation (Figure 16) show a similar effect as for vetting
packages: Because some maintainers are highly influential,
vetting a relatively small number of maintainers can signifi-
cantly reduce security risks. For example, vetting around 140
maintainers cuts down the ITM in half, and vetting around
600 could even reduce ITM to less than five. These results
show that this mechanism scales reasonably well, but that hun-
dreds of maintainers need to be vetted to bring the average
number of implicitly trusted maintainers to a reasonable level.
Moreover, two-factor authentication has its own risks, e.g.,
when developers handle authentication tokens in an insecure
way14 or when attackers attempt to steal such tokens, as in
the eslint-scope incident.
6 Related Work
In this section we discuss the closest related work contained
mainly in two distinct research areas: JavaScript security and
software ecosystem studies. While some of this work studies
the npm ecosystem, to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to analyze in depth the role maintainers play in the
ecosystem and the impact of different types of attacks, as well
as the potential impact of vetting code.
Server-side JavaScript Security There are many studies
that investigate problems with dependency management for
the JavaScript or other ecosystems. Abdalkareem et al. [2] in-
vestigate reasons why developers would use trivial packages.
They find that developers think that these packages are well
implemented and tested and that they increase productivity as
the developer does not need to implement such small features
herself. Another empirical study on micropackages by Kula
et al. [19] has similar results. They show that micropackages
have long dependency chains, something we also discovered
in some case studies of package reach. We also show that
these packages have a high potential of being a target of an
attack as they are dependent on by a lot of packages. Another
previously studied topic is breaking changes introduced by
dependencies. Bogart et al. [5] perform a case study inter-
viewing developers about breaking changes in three different
ecosystems. They find that npm’s community values a fast ap-
proach to new releases compared to the other ecosystems. De-
velopers of npm are more willing to adopt breaking changes
to fight technical debt. Furthermore, they find that the seman-
tic versioning rules are enforced more overtime than in the
beginning. Similarly, Decan et al. [11] analyze three package
14https://blog.npmjs.org/post/182015409750/
automated-token-revocation-for-when-you
ecosystems, including npm, and evaluate whether dependency
constraints and semantic versioning are effective measures
for avoiding breaking changes. They find that both these mea-
sures are not perfect and that there is a need for better tooling.
One such tool can be the testing technique by Mezzetti et
al. [25] which automatically detects whether an update of a
package contains a breaking change in the API. With this
method, they can identify type-related breaking changes be-
tween two versions. They identify 26 breaking changes in 167
updates of important npm packages. Pfretzschner et al. [27]
describe four possible dependency-based attacks that exploit
weaknesses such as global variables or monkeypatching in
Node.js. They implement a detection of such attacks, but they
do not find any real-world exploits. One way to mitigate these
attacks is implemented by Vasilakis et al. [32] in BreakApp, a
tool that creates automatic compartments for each dependency
to enforce security policies. This increases security when us-
ing untrusted third-party packages. Furthermore, third-party
packages can have security vulnerabilities that can impact
all the dependents. Davis et al. [9] and Staicu et al. [29] find
denial of service vulnerabilities in regular expressions in the
npm ecosystem. In another study, Staicu et al. [30] find sev-
eral injection vulnerabilities due to the child_process module
or the eval function. Brown et al. [6] discuss bugs in the
binding layers of both server-side and client-side JavaScript
platforms, while Wang et al. [33] analyze concurrency bugs
in Node.js Finally, Gong [16] presents a dynamic analysis
system for identifying vulnerable and malicious code in npm.
He reports more than 300 previously unknown vulnerabilities,
some of which are clearly visible on the figures in Section 4.3.
Furthermore, there are studies that look at how frequent se-
curity vulnerabilities are in the npm ecosystem, how fast
packages fix these and how fast dependent packages upgrade
to a non-vulnerable version. Chatzidimitriou et al. [7] build
an infrastructure to measure the quality of the npm ecosystem
and to detect publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in package de-
pendencies. Decan et al. [13] perform a similar study but they
investigate the evolution of vulnerabilities over time. They
find that more than half of the dependent packages are still af-
fected by a vulnerability after the fix is released. However, we
show that the problem is even more serious because for more
than half of the npm packages there is no available patch.
Client-Side (JavaScript) Security Client-side security is a
vast and mature research area and it is out scope to extensively
survey it here. Instead, we focus on those studies that ana-
lyze dependencies in client-side code. Nikiforakis et al. [26]
present a study of remote inclusion of JavaScript libraries
in the most popular 10,000 websites. They show that an av-
erage website in their data set adds between 1.5 and 2 new
dependencies per year. Similar to our work, they then discuss
several threat models and attacks that can occur in this tightly
connected ecosystem. Lauinger et al. [20] study the inclusion
of libraries with known vulnerabilities in both popular and
average websites. They show that 37% of the websites in their
data set include at least one vulnerable library. This number
is suprisingly close to the reach we observe in npm for the
vulnerable code. However, one should take both these results
with a grain of salt since inclusion of vulnerable libraries does
not necessary lead to a security problem if the library is used
in a safe way. Libert et al. [22] perform a HTTP-level analysis
of third-party resource inclusions, i.e., dependencies. They
conclude that nine in ten websites leak data to third-parties
and that six in ten spwan third-party cookies.
Studies of Software Ecosystems Software ecosystem re-
search has been rapidly growing in the last year. Manikas [23]
surveys the related work and observes a maturing field at the
intersection of multiple other research areas. Nevertheless,
he identifies a set of challenges, for example, the problem
of generalizing specific ecosystem research to other ecosys-
tems or the lack of theories specific to software ecosystems.
Serebrenik et al. [28] perform a meta-analysis of the diffi-
cult tasks in software ecosystem research and identify six
types of challenges. For example, how to scale the analysis
to the massive amount of data, how to research the quality
and evolution of the ecosystem and how to dedicate more
attention to comparative studies. Mens [24] further looks at
the socio-technical view on software maintenance and evo-
lution. He argues that future research needs to study both
the technical and the social dimension of the ecosystem. Our
study follows this recommendation as it not only looks at the
influence of a package on the npm ecosystem, but also at the
influence of the maintainers. Several related work advocates
metrics borrowed from other fields. For example, Lertwit-
tayatrai et al. [21] use network analysis techniques to study
the topology of the JavaScript package ecosystem and to ex-
tract insights about dependencies and their relations. Another
study by Kabbedijk et al. [17] looks at the social aspect of
the Ruby software ecosystem by identifying different roles
maintainers have in the ecosystem, depending on the number
of developers they cooperate with and on the popularity of
their packages. Overall, the research field is rising with a lot
of studied software ecosystems in addition to the very popular
ones such as JavaScript which is the focus of our study.
Ecosystem Evolution Studying the evolution of an ecosys-
tem shows how fast it grows and whether developers still
contribute to it. Wittern et al. [34] study the whole JavaScript
ecosystem, including GitHub and npm until September 2015.
They focus on dependencies, the popularity of packages and
version numbering. They find that the ecosystem is steadily
growing and exhibiting a similar effect to a power law dis-
tribution as only a quarter of packages is dependent upon.
Comparing these numbers with our results, we see a con-
tinuous near-exponential growth in the number of released
packages and that only 20% of all packages are dependent
upon. A similar study that includes the JavaScript ecosystem
by Kikas et al. [18] collects data until May 2016 and focuses
on the evolution of dependencies and the vulnerability of the
dependency network. They confirm the same general growth
as the previous study. Furthermore, they find packages that
have a high impact with up to 30% of other packages and ap-
plications affected. Our study gives an update on these studies
and additionally looks at the evolution of maintainers as they
are a possible vulnerability in the ecosystem. The dependency
network evolution was also studied for other ecosystems. De-
can et al. [14] compare the evolution of seven different pack-
age managers focusing on the dependency network. Npm is
the largest ecosystem in their comparison and they discover
that dependencies are frequently used in all these ecosystems
with similar connectedness between packages. Bloemen et
al. [4] look at software package dependencies of the Linux
distribution Gentoo where they use cluster analysis to explore
different categories of software. German et al. [15] study the
dependency network of the R language and the community
around its user-contributed packages. Bavota et al. [3] an-
alyze the large Apache ecosystem of Java libraries where
they find that while the number of projects grows linearly, the
number of dependencies between them grows exponentially.
Comparing this to the npm ecosystem, we find the number of
packages to grow super-linearly while the average number of
dependencies between them grows linearly.
7 Conclusions
We present a large-scale study of security threats resulting
from the densely connected structure of npm packages and
maintainers. The overall conclusion is that npm is a small
world with high risks. It is “small” in the sense that packages
are densely connected via dependencies. The security risk are
“high” in the sense that vulnerable or malicious code in a sin-
gle package may affect thousands of others, and that a single
misbehaving maintainer, e.g., due to a compromised account,
may have a huge negative impact. These findings show that
recent security incidents in the npm ecosystem are likely to
be the first signs of a larger problem, and not only unfortunate
individual cases. To mitigate the risks imposed by the current
situation, we analyze the potential effectiveness of several
mitigation strategies. We find that trusted maintainers and a
code vetting process for selected packages could significantly
reduce current risks.
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